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Abstract
A semi-parametric approach is proposed to estimate the variation along time of the
effects of two distinct public policies that were devoted to boost rural development in
France over the same period of time. At a micro data level, it is often observed that
the dependent variable, such as local employment, does not vary along time, so that we
face a kind of zero inflated phenomenon that cannot be dealt with a continuous response
model. We introduce a mixture model which combines a mass at zero and a continuous
response. The suggested zero inflated semi-parametric statistical approach relies on the
flexibility and modularity of additive models with the ability of panel data to deal with
selection bias and to allow for the estimation of dynamic treatment effects. In this multiple
treatment analysis, we find evidence of interesting patterns of temporal treatment effects
with relevant nonlinear policy effects. The adopted semi-parametric modeling also offers
the possibility of making a counterfactual analysis at an individual level. The methodology
is illustrated and compared with parametric linear approaches on a few municipalities
for which the mean evolution of the potential outcomes is estimated under the different
possible treatments.
JEL classification: C14; C23; C54; O18.
Keywords: Additive Models; Semi-parametric Regression; Mixture of Distributions; Panel
Data; Policy Evaluation; Temporal Effects; Multiple Treatments; Local Development.
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1 Introduction
In response to the deteriorating conditions of distressed areas, many countries, such as USA,
UK and France, have established enterprise zone programs (EZ) aimed to increase socio-
economic development by means of boosting local employment. At a supranational level,
territorial cohesion, convergence and a harmonious development across regions are among the
objectives of the European Union which tries to pursue through the structural funds (SF).
Despite their appeal and the high amount of financial resources used, such geographically
targeted policies have been criticized with respect to different aspects and doubts have been
cast with respect to their effectiveness. As far as EZ are concerned, there exists a number
of micro-econometrics works aiming at assessing their economic effects, which provide mixed
results (for surveys, see e.g. Gobillon et al., 2012; Peters and Fisher, 2004). Looking at the
analyses of the effects of regional policies implemented through the European SF, it can be
noted that some earlier studies have been carried out by analyzing the convergence process
and interpreted the descriptive fact of an increasing divergence across the European regions
as an indication that the SF have been ineffective. More recently, some works adopting a
causal framework appeared (Becker et al., 2010; Mohl and Hagen, 2010), but also for these
policies they provided mixed evidence. In summary, the effectiveness of both EZ and SF is a
relevant and contentious issue in the debate regarding local development.
We focus on assessing the effect of the EZ and the SF that were devoted to boost rural
development in France. The municipalities, which correspond to the finest available spatial
level, are the statistical units of the analysis and the dependent variable is the number of
employees, as both programs aim to stimulate employment. The data cover a ten years period,
1993-2002 and such a longitudinal structure constitutes an important source of identification.
Indeed, panel data models have been shown to be very useful for policy evaluation, allowing
to account both for selection on observables and selection on unobservables, and permitting
to specify the models in terms of potential outcome at different points in time (Heckman
and Hotz, 1989; Heckman et al., 1999; Wooldridge, 2005; Hsiao et al., 2011; Lechner, 2015),
time being an essential element in the notion of causality (e.g. Lechner, 2011b). Moreover,
despite the fact that there is an increasing availability of relatively long panel data, most of
the existing micro-level studies on regional policies focus on static effects. There are some
exceptions, suggesting that taking account of dynamic effects is important (see e.g. O’Keefe,
2004; Becker et al., 2010).
This work provides a new contribution to the literature on regional policy evaluation
revealing for the first time some non-linearities as well as heterogeneous policy effects that
have relevant implications for public policy design. The paper also introduces methodological
advances, allowing the estimation in a flexible manner of causal effects that can vary over
time and across units. Such an approach could be useful for future research and outside this
specific field of application.
First, it is often observed at a micro data level that the dependent variable, local em-
ployment in the present study, does not vary over time. This means that when modeling its
variations along time we face a kind of zero inflated phenomenon that cannot be dealt with
a continuous response model. We thus allow the dependent variable to remain constant in
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time with a probability that can be strictly larger than zero. To deal with that phenomenon,
a mixture model (see McLachlan and Peel (2000) for a seminal reference on mixture models)
that combines a Dirac mass at zero and a continuous density is considered.
Second, while a common practice in this literature consists at adopting parametric models
and focusing attention on the mean effect or imposing a homogeneous effect across units, we
relax the parametric specification to model the regression function. Specifically, the consider-
ation of a model in which the effect of the policy is expanded as a nonparametric function of
some variables provides a richer framework that allows for a refined analysis at an individual
level and permits to highlight heterogeneous policy effects, which are missed when focusing
on mean effects. We rely on the rather general framework of additive models and generalized
additive models (Wood, 2017), giving much more flexibility and robustness than usual linear
models, but also addressing the curse of dimensionality problem arising in fully nonparametric
models, which could be an extremely serious problem because of the large number of potential
regressors. Penalized splines are used to represent the non parametric parts of the additive
model (Wood, 2004, 2008) as they have been proven to be useful empirically in many aspects
(see, e.g. Ruppert et al., 2003) and, in recent years, their asymptotic properties have been
studied and then connected to those of regression splines, to those of smoothing splines and to
the Nadaraya - Watson kernel estimators (see, e.g. Li and Ruppert, 2008, Wood et al., 2016).
The estimation is finally carried out by maximizing the corresponding likelihood function,
which is a mixture of a mass at zero and a continuous density.
Finally, the proposed semi-parametric modeling also permits to estimate what would have
been the expected effects of such policies on particular municipalities by performing a coun-
terfactual estimation at an individual level. The evolutions of the potential outcomes are
thus estimated and compared under the different possible treatments for a few municipali-
ties. These municipalities, selected with a clustering k-medoids algorithm (see Kaufman and
Rousseeuw, 1990), represent communes with different but typical characteristics within their
cluster. A comparison of the results with those obtained from some standard parametric
continuous response models finally provides interesting insights into the size of the bias that
may arise when a parametric specification is imposed or the mass of observations at zero is
not accounted for.
It is also worth noting that while most of the previous studies focus on one particular
policy, either EZ or SF, we will assess the effect of both policies as well as their interaction
by adopting a multiple treatments framework (see Frolich, 2004, for a survey).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the rural policies
adopted in France, presents the data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section three is
devoted to the presentation of the econometric framework and of the estimation methodology.
Section four provides the presentation and discussion of our main results while section five
summarizes and concludes. Additional results are given in a supplementary file.
3
2 Description of the policies and data
In France, EZ have been implemented to boost job creation. Such policies are based on fiscal
incentives to firms located in deprived areas. Specifically designed to boost employment of
rural areas, the ZRR (Zones de Revitalisation Rurale) program started the 1st September
1996. A noticeable feature of the program is that the selection of ZRR was clearly not
random. A rather complex algorithm was used to determine the eligibility, according to some
observable – demographic, economic and institutional – criteria. To be eligible to ZRR, a
municipality should be a part of a canton with population density lower than 31 inhabitants
per square km (1990 Population Census)1. The population or the labor force must also have
diminished or the share of the agricultural labor employment must be at least twice the
French average. Finally, to be included into the program, the municipality should belong to a
pre-existing zoning scheme set up by the European Union, which is called TRDP (Territoire
Rural de De´veloppement Prioritaire). However, due to political tempering, it is also likely
that, beyond such observed criteria, other sources of selection on unobservables could affect
the process (Gobillon et al., 2012). A more detailed description of the ZRR program can be
found in Behaghel et al. (2015).
Beyond the French experience, EZ have been largely criticized with respect to several
aspects, such as the possibility of i) windfall effects to firms who would have hired workers
even in absence of the policy; ii) negative spatial spillovers because EZ does not necessarily
result in job creation but could cause geographical shifts in jobs from non-EZ to EZ areas;
iii) stigmatization of the targeted neighborhood; iv) in absence of tax revenue compensation,
EZ could lead to a decrease in the local provision of public services and v) obtaining only
a transitory effect on employment and the need for integrated policies against structural
unemployment.
At a supranational level, the SF are addressed to help lagging or re-structuring regions,
so they are given to regions upon their economic characteristics (such as the per capita GDP
or the unemployment level) and then are assigned from the regions to firms or to public
actors (top-down process) without a clearly expressed assignment mechanism. Then, also
for these policies, sources of selection on both observables and unobservables are expected
to be relevant. Specifically devoted to boost rural development, the objective 5B programs
(1991-93 and 1994-99) allocated financial subsides to firms and public actors located in eligible
“rural areas in decline”. The eligibility criteria for belonging to an objective 5B area (canton)
required that the area has a high share of agricultural employment, a low farming income and
a low level of per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The main goal of 5B programs was
to improve economic development and local infrastructures, and to support the activities of
farms, small and medium sized firms, rural tourism.
Our sample is obtained by merging different data sets. The municipalities, which cor-
respond to the finest available spatial level, are the statistical units of the analysis and the
dependent variable is the number of employees. The data were obtained over a period of ten
years, 1993-2002 (for each year data refer to the 1st January), from the INSEE (Institut Na-
1A canton with a population density less than 5 inhabitants per square km is automatically labelled as ZRR
without any other requirement.
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tional de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) and SIRENE (Syste`me Informatique pour
le Re´pertoire des Entreprises et de leurs E´tablissements) sheet. As explanatory variables, we
dispose of ZRR zoning during the period and of the 5B zoning over the period 1994-99. Some
other explanatory variables come from the CENSUS. Since the CENSUS data are collected
every ten years, and in order to control for the initial conditions, we use data from 1990 CEN-
SUS. Such CENSUS data have been provided by the INSEE in separate sheets, gathering
demographic, education and work’s qualification information. Finally, we also have at hand
information on land use in 1990, obtained thanks to satellite images. After the merging pro-
cess and some cleanings that are detailed in Appendix A of the supplementary file we obtain
a sample of 25593 municipalities.
It can be seen in Table A2 that about 30% of the 25593 municipalities in our sample were
under the ZRR scheme. Over the period 1994-99, about 47% of the municipalities were under
objective 5B. Examining ZRR and 5B jointly, it appears that 50.9% of the municipalities
were under at least one of the two policies. Only 27.4% of the municipalities were, in our
sample, under both policies, whereas 20.6% received a support only from 5B program and
2.8% of the municipalities received the incentives only from ZRR. As expected, the treated
municipalities present lower socio-economic performances compared to the non-treated ones,
with the municipalities under objective 5B alone performing generally better than the other
treated municipalities. Also note that for the estimation of treatment effects, the only partial
overlap between ZRR and 5B programs is a useful source of identification, which is exploited
in this paper to estimate the specific effect of each policy as well as their interaction effect.
3 Model specification and estimation
We borrow notations from Heckman and Hotz (1989) and Frolich (2004). Let i denote a statis-
tical unit (a municipality in our framework) which is assigned to one of R mutually exclusive
development incentives. We denote by Y rit the potential employment level for municipality i
at time t under treatment (incentive) r, for r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R − 1}, with the convention that
r = 0 corresponds to no treatment. Time t is discrete, taking values in t0 < t1 < . . . < tm.
We assume that the incentives are allocated after t0 and that they may produce an effect from
period k, with tk > t0. All the counterfactuals are assumed to be equal before the treatment
begins, that is to say Y rit = Y
0
it for t0 ≤ t < tk and r = 1, 2, . . . , R− 1. As a starting point, we
consider the following general model,
Y rit = Y
0
it t0 ≤ t < tk,
= Y 0it + ∆
r
it, tk ≤ t ≤ tm, (1)
where Y 0it is the employment level for municipality i at time t in the absence of development
funds (r = 0). For time t ≥ tk, ∆rit is simply the difference between Y rit and Y 0it , that is
to say the differential effect on the potential outcome, compared to no treatment at all, of
treatment r on unit i. With this general model, ∆rit is allowed to vary from one statistical
unit to another and also to depend on time t.
Let us denote by Di, with Di ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R − 1}, the treatment status of municipality
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i, that is supposed to be a random variable. Consider now a set of characteristics Xi =
(Xi1, . . . , Xip) observed during the first period of time t0, which are the initial conditions.
3.1 Identification issues
A classical condition in policy evaluation (see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), generally re-
ferred to as conditional independence assumption, unconfoundedness or selection on observ-
ables, is that
Y rit ⊥⊥ Di | Xi, (2)
so that the information contained in the observed variables Xi makes the potential outcomes
Y rit unconfounded, that is, conditionally independent of the treatment status Di given Xi.
Since selection bias may not be completely eliminated even after controlling for the ob-
servables Xi, it is also important to note that a before-after approach may help to address
the issue of selection on unobservables. We thus consider that the conditional independence
assumption (2) holds for the difference of the outcome after and before the beginning of the
policy,
Y rit − Y 0it0 ⊥⊥ Di | Xi, ∀r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R− 1}. (3)
The new conditional independence assumption (3) is a less restrictive condition than (2).2
It is worth mentioning that we could consider propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983; Angrist and Hahn, 2004; Imai and Van Dyk, 2004) in place of X, in the conditioning
variables appearing in (3). This would ensure that D is conditionally independent of the
potential outcomes while achieving dimensional reduction. One drawback of this approach,
which can be effective for estimating mean effects on the treated or on the whole population,
is interpretation (see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009) as well as the fact that the propen-
sity scores may not be highly relevant variables to estimate accurately the variations of the
conditional potential outcomes, given the vector of covariates X. Indeed, we can split the
vector of all the available covariates X into four parts,
X = (XY ∩D, XY¯ ∩D, XY ∩D¯, XY¯ ∩D¯) ,
where XY ∩D is the set of covariates that are related both to Y rt −Y 0t0 and D and XY¯ ∩D is the
set of covariates that are independent of Y rt − Y 0t0 but are related to D. Note that these two
sets, XY ∩D and XY¯ ∩D, represent the variables entering the propensity score function. The
set XY ∩D¯ is the set of covariates that are related to Y rt − Y 0t0 but are independent of D and
XY¯ ∩D¯ is the set of covariates that are independent of Y rt − Y 0t0 and D (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 about here
The smallest set of conditioning variables required to satisfy condition (3) is XY ∩D. How-
ever, since one of the aims in this work is to estimate, at an individual level, the variation
over time of the expected potential effects of the different policies, we also take account of
the set of variables XY ∩D¯ in a way that is as flexible as possible to have a better prediction
2See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion.
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of the potential outcomes. As a result, our statistical approach is built by modeling in a non
parametric way the relation between Y rt −Y 0t0 and X and by selecting, among all the available
variables, the variables that belong to one of the two sets XY ∩D and XY ∩D¯. Note that if we
were interested in the best possible estimation of the propensity scores, i.e. the scores giving
the probability of receiving policy r, for r = 0, . . . , R − 1, our statistical models would have
focused on the sets of variables XY¯ ∩D and XY ∩D.
In the following Sections it is assumed that the set of covariatesX is restricted toXY ∩D and
XY ∩D¯. Other observed variables that could be considered are those that influence selection
into the program even if they do not affect directly the outcome, i.e. XY¯ ∩D. Introducing these
variables in the regression function may help to solve the problem of selection on observables,
provided there is no misspecification error, using the terminology by Heckman and Hotz
(1989). Appendix A provides further comments on this issue while the variable selection
procedure is described in Section 4.
3.2 Zero inflation and econometric modeling
A relevant feature of this study is that the statistical units are generally demographically small
and we observe no variation at all of the dependent variable along time for a non negligible
fraction of the municipalities, i.e. Y Diit = Yit0 . Table A3 in the Supplementary file shows
that the modal value of Y Diit − Yit0 is indeed 0 for all the values of t, with t varying between
1994 to 2002 and t0 corresponding to the year 1993. We can also remark that the fraction
of zeros decreases with t and varies with the treatment status. The estimated distribution of
the dependent variable, Y Diit − Yit0 , for t = 1994, which is a mixture of a mass at 0 and a
continuous density function, is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2 about here
This empirical fact leads us to introduce a new econometric model that is able to take
account of this important feature of the data. There is a kind of zero inflated effect that
can not be dealt with a classical continuous response model. We thus allow Y Diit − Y 0it0 to
be equal to zero with a probability that may be strictly larger than 0. Let us denote by
∆Diit =
∑R−1
r=0 1{Di=r}∆
r
it, with ∆
r
it = Y
r
it − Y 0it0 . We propose to describe the distribution of
the counterfactual variation of the level of employment ∆rit as a mixture of a mass at 0 and
a continuous distribution. Using the decomposition Y rit − Y 0it = Y rit − Y 0it0 −
(
Y 0it − Y 0it0
)
, we
obtain that the expected conditional effect at time t of policy r compared to no policy is
expressed as follows,
E
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
= E
[
Y rit − Y 0it0 | Xi
]− E [Y 0it − Y 0it0 | Xi]
= E
[
Y rit − Y 0it0 | Xi,∆rit 6= 0
]× (1− P [∆rit = 0 | Xi]) (4)
− E [Y 0it − Y 0it0 | Xi,∆0it 6= 0]× (1− P [∆0it = 0 | Xi]) (5)
Expressions (4) and (5), which explicitly take account of the zero inflation feature of the
counterfactual outcome variations, are the main object of interest in this paper.
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3.3 A flexible semi-parametric modeling approach
Suppose now we have a sample (Y Diit , Xi, Di)i=1,...,n, for t ∈ {t0, . . . , tm}. We can write
Y Diit =
R−1∑
r=0
Y rit1{Di=r} (6)
where the indicator function satisfies 1{Di=r} = 1 if Di = r and zero else. Consequently,
we can express the expected variation along time Y Diit − Y 0it0 , of the employment level of
municipality i given that ∆Diit 6= 0, as follows,
E
[
Y Diit − Y 0it0 |Xi,∆Diit 6= 0
]
= µ0t (Xi) +
R−1∑
r=1
1{Di=r}α
r
t (Xi), (7)
The term αrt (Xi) which reflects in (7) the impact of treatment r should be equal to zero when
t0 ≤ t < tk whereas µ0t (Xi) corresponds to the expected variation under no policy.
Introducing (7) in (4) and (5), we can also express, given Xi, the expected effect of policy
r at time t as follows
E
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
= (1− P [∆rit = 0 | Xi])× αrt (Xi)
− (P [∆rit = 0 | Xi]− P [∆0it = 0 | Xi])× µ0t (Xi). (8)
The conditional expected counterfactual in (8) is composed of two main terms that may act in
opposite directions, so that interpretation is more difficult compared to usual policy evaluation
models based on continuous response regression models that do not take account of the zero
inflation effect.
In the econometric literature, a common practice consists in modeling µ0t (Xi) and α
r
t (Xi)
using parametric specifications, where the µ0t (Xi) is usually a linear function, µ
0
t (Xi) = µ
0
t +∑p
j=1 β
0
jtXij , and the term α
r
t (Xi) does vary with the covariates or is expanded as a linear
function of them (see e.g. Heckman and Hotz, 1989, eq. 3.9). The linearity assumption is
strong and a miss-specification of the relation between Y rit − Yit0 and the regressors may lead
to wrong results and interpretation of the policy effect. We thus prefer to consider a more
general model that can take account of non linear effects nonparametrically via an additive
form (Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990; Wood, 2017). This also makes the underlying identification
conditions less restrictive (Lechner, 2011a).
The expected value that would be obtained at time t for a municipality with characteristics
Xi under no treatment, is supposed to be additively modeled as follows,
µ0t (Xi) = µ
0
t +
p∑
j=1
g0jt(Xij), (9)
where g0jt(.), j = 1, . . . , p, are unknown smooth univariate functions. The identifiability
constraints
E
[
g0jt(Xj) | ∆0t 6= 0
]
= 0, j = 1, . . . , p,
ensure that µ0t represents the mean value of the variation of the potential outcome between t
and t0 if all the units in the population would have received no incentives at all.
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A key assumption of this paper is that the conditional differential policy effect αrit = α
r
t (Xi)
can be expressed, given the vector of covariates Xi, with the following additive model,
αrit = α
r
t +
p∑
j=1
grjt(Xij), (10)
where grjt(.), j = 1, . . . , p are unknown smooth functions satisfying the identifiability con-
straints
E
[
grjt(Xj)| ∆rt 6= 0
]
= 0, j = 1, . . . , p.
Consequently, αrt represents the mean effect, over the whole population, at period t of treat-
ment r and the function grjt(.) reveals how the mean impact of the policy r is modulated by
the individual characteristics of each considered statistical unit.
Note that a simple extension of (10) consists in considering interactions between covariates
instead of additive effects. For 2 ≤ d ≤ p, the additive effects of d covariates, gr1t(Xi1) +
gr2t(Xi2) + · · ·+ gdt(Xid) can be replaced by a more general multivariate function
αrit = α
r
t + g
r
1,2,...,d,t(Xi1, Xi2, . . . , Xid)
that could allow a more flexible fit to the data, at the expense of a more difficult interpretability
and, because of the curse of dimensionality, less precise estimates. The behavior of functions
grjt is of central interest and our general model encompasses the following particular cases, i)
no effect of the policy r compared to no treatment at all, when αrt = 0 and g
r
jt = 0 for all
t ≥ tk; ii) linear trends in time when αrt = αr0 + αr1t and linear effects of the covariates when
grjt(Xij) = β
r
jtXij and iii) polynomial trends in time and polynomial effects of the covariates,
as well as smooth threshold effects.
We suppose that the probability that Y Diit −Yit0 = 0 given the covariates can be expressed
with a generalized additive model and a logit link function. Using a similar decomposition as
in (6), we consider the following logistic regression models, for t = t1, . . . , tm,
logit
(
P
[
Y Diit − Y 0it0 = 0 | Xi
])
= β00t +
R−1∑
r=1
1{Di=r}δβ
r
0t +
p∑
j=1
βjt(Xij), (11)
where βjt(.) are unknown smooth univariate functions. For our purpose, the most important
parameters are the differential effects δβr0t, r = 1, . . . , R − 1. For example, if δβr0t > 0, then
the probability no variation is larger under policy r compared to no policy at all (r = 0)
given the covariates Xi = (Xi1, . . . , Xip). Recall that the unknown functions βjt(Xij) are not
necessarily linear and that it would be possible to consider a more sophisticated model that
could take interaction effects into account, replacing βjt(Xij) by β
r
jt(Xij), for r = 1, . . . , R−1.
3.4 Estimation procedure
We observe, for a statistical unit i, the realized outcomes Y Diit at instants t = t0, . . . , tm,
whereas the counterfactuals Y rit , for r 6= Di, cannot be observed. The estimation of the pa-
rameters and functions defined in (9), (10) and (11), relies on the sample (Y Diit , Xi, Di)i=1,...,n,
for t ∈ {t0, . . . , tm}. We assume that there are no spatial interactions between the statistical
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units so that (Y Diit , Xi, Di) and (Y
D`
`t , X`, D`) can be supposed to be independent if i 6= `.
This hypothesis can be easily relaxed by allowing, for instance, spatial spillover effects via the
definition of additional covariates that take account of the treatments received by the neigh-
boring municipalities (see Appendix C). The tm− t0 samples (Y Diit −Y 0it0 , Xi, Di)i=1,...,n, with
t = t1, . . . , tm are used separately to estimate the parameters of interest and the regression
functions.
The fact that the considered mixture is a mixture of a continuous variable and a discrete
variable makes the computation of the likelihood rather simple compared to mixtures of con-
tinuous variables or mixtures of discrete variables (see McLachlan and Peel (2000)). Indeed,
as far as the continuous part is concerned, the probability of no variation is equal to zero and
we can proceed as if the two underlying distributions were adjusted separately. Assuming
(Y Diit − Y 0it0 , i = 1 . . . , n) are conditionally Gaussian and independent random variables, the
likelihood at each instant t, is given by
Lt =
n∏
i=1
pTitit (1− pit)1−TitfDit (Y Diit − Y 0it0 ;Xi, Di)1−Tit
where Tit = 1{∆Diit =0}
is the indicator function of no variation between t and t0 and pit =
P
[
∆Diit = 0 | Xi, Di
]
. Taking account now of the different policies, the log-likelihood can be
expressed as follows,
lnLt =
∑
i:Tit=1
ln pit +
∑
i:Tit=0
ln(1− pit) (12)
+
∑
i:Tit=0
R−1∑
r=0
1{Di=r} ln f
r
t (Y
Di
it − Y 0it0 ;Xi, Di), (13)
so that the probability of no variation can be estimated separately by maximizing the terms
at the right-hand side of (12), whereas the additive models related to the continuous variation
of Y Dt − Y 0t0 are estimated by maximizing the function at the right-hand side of (13). This
means that in practice, the subsample {i |Tit = 0} is used for the adjustment of the additive
models related to the continuous part. The estimation of the unknown functional parameters
introduced in (9), (10) and (11), which are supposed to be smooth functions, is performed
thanks to the mgcv library in the R language (see Wood, 2017, for a general presentation).
The regression functions to be estimated are expanded in spline basis and a penalized like-
lihood criterion is maximized. Penalties, tuned by smoothing parameters, are added to the
log-likelihood in order to control the trade off between smoothness of the estimated functions
and fidelity to the data. To select the values of the smoothing parameters, restricted maximum
likelihood (REML) estimation was preferred over alternative approaches such as Generalized
Cross Validation (GCV) or Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), since such approaches may
lead to under-smoothing and are more likely to develop multiple minima than REML. Point-
wise confidence intervals that take account of the smoothing parameter uncertainty can be
obtained as in Wood et al. (2016) and variable selection is performed following Marra and
Wood (2011).
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4 Results
The main goal of this paper is the estimation of the mean differential effect, E
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
,
of policy r compared to no policy, for a unit with characteristics Xi. This conditional ex-
pectation, which is expressed in (8), depends on different ingredients. Estimations of αrt (.)
and µ0t (.) are related to the continuous part of the model while the discrete one provides us
information about the conditional probabilities P [∆rit = 0 | Xi] and P
[
∆0it = 0 | Xi
]
.
After a discussion about the parameters of interest, we briefly present some preliminary
estimation results for both the continuous and the discrete part of the model, taken separately.
We then provide our main results. Since our model allows the policy effect to vary both in time
and across units, we specifically provide a temporal counterfactual analysis at an individual
level, with an illustration on a few representative municipalities for which the evolutions of
the potential outcomes are estimated and compared under the different possible treatments.
This could provide interesting economic and policy oriented advices. We finally provide some
insights into the size of bias that may arise when a parametric specification is imposed or the
mass of observations at zero is not not accounted for, by comparing the proposed approach
with some standard methods.
4.1 Parameters of interest
We focus on the assessment of ZRR and 5B as well as their joint mean effect. The partial
overlap of these two schemes makes possible the identification of the interaction effect of ZRR
and 5B. We thus adopt a framework with R = 4 multiple potential outcomes and consider
the generalized treatment variable, Di ∈ {0, ZRR, 5B,ZRR&5B} indicating the programme
in which municipality i actually participated. The modality 0 indicates that the municipality
i did not receive any policy, ZRR (respectively 5B) indicates that the municipality i re-
ceived incentives only from ZRR (respectively only from 5B) and ZRR&5B indicates that
the municipality i received incentives both from ZRR and 5B.
As far as the continuous response is concerned, the parameter α5Bt measures the mean
differential effect, over the whole sample, of policy 5B compared to no policy at all (r =
0) whereas the joint effect of ZRR and 5B is given by αZRR&5Bt . Finally, concerning the
effect of ZRR, it can be noticed that only a few municipalities (precisely 722) are treated
in this case. Consequently, we prefer to focus our attention on the 7014 municipalities that
receive incentives both from 5B and ZRR and we calculate the following differential effect
αZRRt = α
ZRR&5B
t −α5Bt . This differential effect simply represents the mean difference between
the outcome when receiving incentives both from ZRR and 5B and the outcome when only
5B applies. The same reasoning applies to the interpretation of the expected conditional
differential effect αrit in (10) as well as for the parameter δβ
r
0t when dealing with the estimation
of the conditional probability of a null employment variation in (11).
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4.2 Preliminary results
The continuous response
As far as the continuous response is considered, additive models are fitted on the subsamples
{i |Y Diit − Yit0 6= 0}. We focus attention on the expected conditional differential effect αrit, for
tk ≤ t ≤ tm and r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1}, while the results about the effect of the initial conditions,
which enter nonparametrically via the additive smooth functions
∑p
j=1 g
0
jt(Xij) in (9), are not
discussed here but are available upon request.
A backward variable selection procedure has been employed to select the variables to be
introduced in the regression functions defined in (9) such that the conditional independence
assumption (3) holds. This procedure leaded us to retain 11 variables among the 16 initial
variables (the selected variables are those reported in Table A2 in the Supplementary file).
We consider pre-treatment covariates, say Xpre, in the set of observable variables X to
ensure that D causes X and Y causes X do not occur.3 This is likely to be relevant in our
economic context where it could be expected that the covariates prior the introduction of the
policy, such as for example the share of qualified workers or the existing stock of infrastructure,
cause both the inclusion in the program D, and the potential local employment Y (Xpre → D
and Xpre → Y ). After the introduction of the policy, the level of such covariates, say Xpost,
is likely to be affected by its past values Xpre, by the treatment D and finally also by the
response variable Y . Indeed, in the example mentioned above, the share of qualified workers
and the stock of infrastructure may be directly affected by the policy (D → Xpost) and since
the introduction of the policy could have also increased local employment (D → Y ), this may
in turn stimulate the creation of new infrastructure/qualified hires (Y → Xpost). In such
a causal framework, Xpre should be controlled for whereas Xpost should not (see Lee, 2005;
Lechner, 2011a).
Also note that the vector Xi may contain the initial level of employment. Including the
initial outcome as a regressor is particularly relevant if the average outcomes of the treated
and the control groups differ substantially at the first period, as in this case (see e.g. Imbens
and Wooldridge, 2009; Lechner, 2015)
As expected, the initial outcome was found highly significant and has been included. In
almost all cases the linearity was clearly rejected in favor of nonlinear regression functions.
We also remark that not imposing a linear relation in (9) leads to retain a larger number
of significant variables compared to simpler linear regression models since there are only 6
significant variables when imposing linear relations.4
Since a major interest lies in assessing possible heterogeneous treatment effects, we examine
how the effect of a policy may vary with some economic or demographic characteristics of
the municipalities. For that purpose, we consider a generalization of model (10) in which
interactions between variables are allowed. The model selection procedure allowed us to
retain only two significant variablesto fit αrit, in (10): the initial level of employment (SIZE)
3Lee (2005) labels collider the situation when both D and Y cause X.
4Also note that almost the same results would have been obtained if we would have employed the double
penalty variable selection approach proposed by Marra and Wood (2011) (detailed results are available upon
request).
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of the municipality and its population density (DENSITY). Using an approximate ANOVA
test procedure (see Wood, 2017), an additive structure for αrit, i.e α
r
it = α
r
t+ g
r
1t(SIZEi) +
gr2t(DENSITYi) is strongly rejected for all years t in favor of a more general model based on
bivariate regression functions,
αrit = α
r
t + g
r
t (SIZEi, DENSITYi), r = 1, . . . , R− 1.
As seen in Table A5 in the Supplementary file, a first result that emerges is that the
estimates of the parametric part of (10), representing the mean effect of the policies for the
subsamples {i |Y Diit − Yit0 6= 0}, i.e. αrt , indicate a very short-run (abrupt but transitory)
and quite low mean effect of ZRR. Indeed, the estimated value of αZRRt for the pre-program
years is close to zero and is clearly not significant; then, it grows and rises up to 2.159
(p-values= 0.063) when t = 1999. Afterwards, it sharply decreases and becomes close to
zero again at the end of the period. It is instead highlighted a gradual start, long-term duration
mean effect for the joint 5B-ZRR treatment since α̂5ZRR&5Bt grows overtime, reaching the pick
of 3.537 (p-values= 0.001) when t = 1999 and then it slowly decreases over time. Finally,
α̂5Bit has a similar time pattern than α̂
ZRR&5B
t but it is not significant at standard levels.
Next, the examination of the nonparametric part grt (.) of (10), reveals how the mean
impact of the policy r varies as a function of the characteristics in terms of density and size
of each considered statistical unit (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 about here
In almost all cases, the smooth functions appear to be highly significant, using a Bayesian
approach to variance estimation (Wood, 2012), with generally quite high effective degrees of
freedom, thus indicating rather complex functions (see Wood, 2017). For all the treatments,
we first note that both the magnitude and the shape of the nonparametric effect vary with
time. Looking at ZRR, the estimated smooth function ĝZRRt (SIZEi, DENSITYi) is very flat
and close to zero at the beginning and at the end of the period whereas it becomes clearly
nonlinear with a bell-shaped pattern for a period of a few years after the introduction of the
policy. The maximum of these functions is generally reached for levels of DENSITY slightly
above 50 and for levels of SIZE at about 150, even if the location of these maxima slightly
change over time. For the last two years, the maximum is reached for slightly smaller and
denser municipalities. Note that in the plots, the domain of SIZE and DENSITY has been
appropriately reduced to focus on municipalities not having a too large sizes or very high
levels of density. The joint nonparametric effect of ZRR and 5B, ĝZRR&5Bt (SIZEi, DENSITYi)
behaves similarly in terms of shape and time pattern but with a stronger effect for the years
1999 and 2000. Finally, the estimated nonparametric surface measuring the effect of 5B,
ĝ5Bt (SIZEi, DENSITYi), is generally quite flat, even if some positive effects appeared for rather
low levels of DENSITY and for t ≥ 1999.
Modeling the probability of no variation
Generalized additive models based on binomial regression with logit link function are fitted
to estimate the probability that a variation of the response between t and t0 does not occur,
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given the treatment status and the initial conditions. This conditional probability is expressed
in (11).
Again, a backward variable selection procedure has been employed to select the variables
to be introduced in the model. The estimation results are presented in Table A5 and indicate
that the 5B program has a negative effect on the probability that employment does not vary
along time. The estimated parameter δ̂β
5B
0t is always negative, in a significant way for nearly all
instants t. Referring to (11), this means that P
[
∆5Bit = 0 | Xi
]−P [∆0it = 0 | Xi] < 0. When,
looking at ZRR, it can be noted that the estimated parameter δ̂β
ZRR
0t is always positive, but
is not significant in most of the cases, so that P
[
∆ZRRit = 0 | Xi
] − P [∆0it = 0 | Xi] is not
significantly different from zero. Finally, the estimated joint policy effect δ̂β
ZRR&5B
0t is always
very close to zero and is never significant.
As far as the mean differential effect, E
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
in (8) is concerned, these results
suggest that, for both ZRR and the joint policy ZRR&5B, this differential effect is mostly
affected by the first part of the expression, i.e. by (1− P [∆rit = 0 | Xi])×αrt (Xi). Conversely,
for 5B, there is an additional effect arising from the second part of the expression, since, as
noted before, P
[
∆5Bit = 0 | Xi
]− P [∆0it = 0 | Xi] < 0.
4.3 Main results
Counterfactual analysis at an individual level
We now provide the main results of the estimation and combine information from the two
parts, the continuous and the discrete one, of the mixture model. Notably, our nonparametric
approach allows for non-linear and local effects and thus make it possible to conduct a temporal
counterfactual analysis at an individual level. This relevant feature is illustrated on a few
representative municipalities for which the evolutions of the potential outcomes are estimated
and compared under the different possible treatments. These municipalities have been chosen
with a clustering partition around medoids procedure (see Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990)
with four clusters so that they represent four different homogeneous groups. Descriptive
statistics are given in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
Using (4), (5), (10) and (11) we can estimate what would have been the evolution of the
expected effect of each municipality under each policy, taking account of the zero inflation
effect. We are also interested in building confidence intervals. Due to the complexity of
our statistical estimations at an individual level, which are products of predictions obtained
with generalized additive models, the standard delta method cannot be used easily. We
consider instead the more flexible bootstrap approach (see e.g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993)
to approximate the distribution of the conditional counterfactual outcome of each selected
municipality i having characteristics Xi.
We draw B = 1000 bootstrap samples and for each bootstrap sample b, with b = 1, . . . B,
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we make the following estimation of the expected counterfactual evolution (see (8)),
Êb
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
=
(
1− P̂b [∆rit = 0 | Xi]
)
× α̂r,bt (Xi)
−
(
P̂b [∆rit = 0 | Xi]− P̂b
[
∆0it = 0 | Xi
])× µ̂0,bt (Xi),
where P̂b [∆rit = 0 | Xi] is the estimated probability, with sample b, of no employment variation
and α̂r,bt (Xi) and µ̂
0,b
t (Xi) are the fitted values. Then, we can deduce, using the percentile
method, bootstrap confidence intervals for the conditional expectation E
[
Y rit − Y 0it | Xi
]
, i.e
the mean effect at time t on municipality with characteristics Xi of treatment r compared to
no treatment.
Temporal policy effects for the selected municipalities
Estimated expected counterfactual values as well as bootstrap confidence intervals are drawn
in Figure 4 for the four municipalities under study. The first selected municipality, which
is named DSI1, is an extremely dense and urbanized municipality, with values of DENSITY
and URB greater than the 95th percentile. It is also very rich in terms of INCOME and big in
terms of SIZE, with values of these variables about the 80th percentile. For this municipality,
we estimate a positive evolution of employment in the absence of any policy. We can also
note that, according to our model, ZRR, 5B and the joint policies ZRR&5B would have no
significant effect on the evolution of employment for the considered period. .
The second municipality, named DS3, is rather dense, urbanized and big, with values of
DENSITY, URB and SIZE about the 75th percentile of our sample. The value of INCOME is
close to the median. We note that the effect of 5B is quite low – and is only significant for
t = 1997 and t = 1998 – and presents a rather flat evolution over time, whereas both ZRR
and the joint policy ZRR&5B have a higher impact on employmememt, with an inverted U
pattern. Such an impact increases over the years reaching a peak for t = 1999 and then it
slowly decreases during the following years.
Figure 4 about here
The third municipality, DSI3, is quite close to the median values in terms of DENSITY and
SIZE. For this municipality, all the policies produce an effect with an inverted U time pattern,
even if the effect of ZRR is significant only for a short period, i.e. over 1998-2001. Finally, for
the last municipality DSI7, which is a small and poor municipality, there is a clear positive
effect of 5B over all the period (except the last year), with again an inverted U pattern over
time. For this municipality, ZRR has instead no significant effect over the whole period.
These results highlight that ZRR and 5B are likely to produce temporal effects that vary
according to the typology of the municipalities. Indeed, while the structural funds 5B are
effective for very small and rural municipalities, the fiscal incentives through ZRR produce an
effect for bigger and more dense/urbanized areas. This result is consistent with the idea that
agglomeration externalities (Devereux et al., 2007) and an adequate size of the local market
are essential in order to make such fiscal incentives effective, while the structural funds, which
mainly cover investments in infrastructure, technology and productive assets, may produce
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an effect even for very deprived areas. Finally, the lack of effects for extremely dense and big
municipalities is not surprising because only few municipalities with such characteristics are
treated and the policies under investigation have not been designed for such a typology of
municipality.
Our results can be seen as a refinement of previous studies focusing on average effects. As
far as the French experience is concerned, Behaghel et al. (2015) did not find any significant
average effect of ZRR at a canton level over the period, even if they underlyine that “this
lack of effect may hide positive impacts on some specific segments” (Behaghel et al., 2015,
p. 9). It can be also noted that beyond the French experience, the literature generally
provides mixed evidence. In some papers a significant effect on employment (Papke, 1994;
Ham et al., 2011) is noted for such policies whereas some other works indicate that EZ have
been ineffective (Bondonio and Engberg, 2000; Neumark and Kolko, 2010), or only provide
a transitory effect (O’Keefe, 2004). Moreover, as far as the structural funds are concerned,
Becker et al. (2010) focus attention on the effect of Objective 1 on regional growth for NUTS2
and NUTS3 regions and find evidence of temporal effects, with an average effect that takes
four years to become significant and increases afterwards up to the sixth and last available
year after its introduction. Overall, we provide evidence that allowing the effect of the policy
to vary in time and across municpalities can be useful to show the existence of temporal effects
over short periods of time for some specific municipalities, which otherwise could be missed
when looking at average effects over time. The next subsection will provide further insights
on such an issue.
A comparison with standard parametric approaches
As a final step, we compare the proposed approach with some standard methods, which are
based on parametric models or which do not account for the mass at zero. This may provide
relevant insights because, as stressed for instance by Lechner (2011a), the size of the bias of
misspecified parametric models can be assessed only through a comparison. The models we
consider are listed below:
• Model 1: Linear continuous response model with homogeneous temporal effect, µ0t (Xi) =
µ0t +
∑p
j=1 β
0
jtXij ; α
r
it = α
r
t .
• Model 2: Linear continuous response model with linear policy interactions, µ0t (Xi) =
µ0t +
∑p
j=1 β
0
jtXij ; α
r
it = α
r
t + γ
r
t SIZEi + θ
r
t DENSITYi.
• Model 3: Linear mixture distribution model with linear policy interactions, µ0t (Xi) =
µ0t +
∑p
j=1 β
0
jtXij ; α
r
it = α
r
t + γ
r
t SIZEi + θ
r
t DENSITYi.
• Model 4: Additive mixture distribution model with nonparametric policy interactions,
µ0t (Xi) = µ
0
t +
∑p
j=1 g
0
jt(Xij); α
r
it = α
r
t + g
r
t (SIZEi, DENSITYi).
The first model is a continuous parametric response model. It is simple extension of
the difference-in-differences estimator that allows for temporal policy effects and that takes
account of linear effects of the initial conditions. This model is very standard in the policy
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evaluation literature. Also, note that in Model 1, the policy effect does not change across
municipalities. The second one allows the term αrit to be a linear function of SIZE and DENSITY.
The third one extends the previous one by handling the zero inflation effect. Finally, the fourth
model is the one we propose in this paper allowing for additive smooth effects of the initial
conditions, nonparametric policy interactions and handling the zero inflation phenomenon.
Figure 5 about here
As an illustrative example, we focus on municipality DSI3, whose values of SIZE and
DENSITY are close to the median. The results are depicted in Figure 5. As far as Model 1 is
concerned, we note that none of the policies is found to provide a significant effect, the only
exception being the joint 5B-ZRR policy at time t = 1999. This result appears to be in sharp
contrast with the results from the proposed Model 4, which highlights nonlinear and significant
temporal effects for all the treatments. We can also remark the big difference concerning
the estimated employment under no treatment when comparing the two approaches. Then,
when moving to Model 2/Model 3, some temporal effects appear, even if, by imposing a
parametric policy interaction, αrit = α
r
t + γ
r
t SIZEi + θ
r
t DENSITYi, we obtain very different time
patterns of the estimated effects compared to the ones obtained with the more flexible Model
4. Specifically, while models 2 and 3 indicate a monotonically increasing overtime effect of 5B
and an increasing effect of ZRR, with a threshold for the last years in the sample, Model 4
suggests an inverted U pattern for both policies. Finally, it is worth comparing Model 2 with
Model 3, where the only difference is the fact of accounting or not for the mass of observations
at zero. When comparing these two models, it can be noted that the policy effects present
similar temporal patterns but handling the zero inflation feature of the data makes increase
the estimated policy effect of about 15% -20%. The same result is obtained when comparing
Model 4 with a similar model that does not account for the mass of observations at zero.We
finally note that allowing for nonlinear effects of the initial conditions greatly affects the
estimates of the policy effects. As an example, when we estimate a model similar to model
4 by imposing the restriction αrit = α
r
t , we find evidence of significant temporal effects, while
when we also impose linear effects of the initial conditions, we do not find any significant
effect as in Model 1.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduce a semi-parametric approach to estimate the variation along time
and across municipalities of regional treatment effects in France. Since we face a kind of
zero inflated phenomenon that cannot be dealt properly with a continuous distribution, we
consider a mixture distribution model that combines a Dirac mass at zero and a continuous
response. We rely on additive models for the continuous response and generalized additive
models for modeling the probabiltiy of a mass at zero, giving more flexibility than linear
models, and we exploit the longitudinal structure of the data to account for selection bias.
We find that the different policies under investigation are likely to produce temporal effects
that vary according to the typology of the municipalities. We also documented that using the
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proposed semi-parametric model that allows the effect of the policy to vary in time and across
municipalities is crucial to show the existence of temporal effects over short periods of time for
some specific municipalities, which otherwise will be missed when using standard parametric
approaches. We finally provide evidence that accounting for the mass of observation at zero
is important to avoid a substantial underestimation of the effect of the policies.
This work provides new results about the pattern of temporal treatment effects and non-
linear interactions, as well as some guidance for future research. It first suggests, within a
flexible semi-parametric regression framework, a way to deal with an excess of zeros by con-
sidering a mixture of a continuous and a discrete distribution. This may be relevant for other
policy evaluations when the dependent variable does not vary along time for a non-negligible
fraction of the units. Second, the consideration of a model in which the effect of the policy
is expanded as a nonparametric function of the covariates provides a richer framework that
allows for a finer analysis and permits to perform a counterfactual estimation at an individual
level. This could be relevant in many cases in which heterogeneous policy effects are likely to
be present or when there is an interest in units having some peculiar characteristics.
Finally note that the proposed model is flexible and modular enough so that it can be
extended in various directions. In our opinion, an extremely relevant issue concerns the
possible existence of policy effects on neighboring municipalities, i.e. spatial spillover effects
(see e.g. Behaghel et al., 2015). Appendix C in the Supplementary material indicates that
using our local approach, instead of focusing on average effects, can be crucial to highlight
the existence of significant spillover effects and suggests that further studies may deepen such
an issue.
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D −→ Y rt − Yt0
↗ ↑ ↗ ↑
XY¯ ∩D XY ∩D XY ∩D¯
Figure 1: The expected causal relation between Y rt − Yt0 , X and D
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Figure 2: The estimated distribution of Y Diit −Yit0 for t = 1994 and t0 = 1993. The probability
of observing no variation is estimated by the proportion of observations such that Y Diit −Yit0 =
0 whereas the continuous density of Y Diit − Yit0 6= 0 is estimated thanks to kernel density
estimators, with two different standard ways of selecting the bandwidth value. Silverman:
Silverman’s rule of thumb; BCV: Biased Cross Validation (see Silverman, 1986; Sheather,
2004).
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(c) 5B
Figure 3: Contour plots of ĝrt (SIZE, DENSITY).
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(d) DSI7
Figure 4: Counterfactual estimation of the evolution of the employment level for the selected mu-
nicipalities. The first plot (top left) represents the estimated evolution of employment when no funds
are given to the municipality. The others plots represent the difference of evolution between the joint
policies ZRR and Five B compared to only Five B (top right), between Five B and no policy (bottom
left) and between the joint policies ZRR and Five B compared to no policy at all. Mean values are
drawn in plain line and 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in dotted line.
24
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
2
4
6
No policy
Year
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t e
vo
lu
tio
n
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
ZRR and FiveB vs FiveB
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
1
0
1
2
3
FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
1
0
1
2
3
ZRR and FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(a) Model 1
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
2
0
2
4
6
No policy
Year
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t e
vo
lu
tio
n
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
1
0
1
2
3
ZRR and FiveB vs FiveB
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
1
2
3
4
FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
1
2
3
4
ZRR and FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(b) Model 2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
2
0
2
4
6
No policy
Year
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t e
vo
lu
tio
n
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
1
0
1
2
3
ZRR and FiveB vs FiveB
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
1
2
3
4
5
FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
1
2
3
4
5
ZRR and FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(c) Model 3
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
0
5
10
15
20
25
No policy
Year
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t e
vo
lu
tio
n
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
1
0
1
2
3
ZRR and FiveB vs FiveB
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
2
0
2
4
FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
−
2
0
2
4
ZRR and FiveB vs No policy
Year
D
el
ta
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(d) Model 4
Figure 5: Counterfactual estimation of the evolution of the employment level for the selected munic-
ipality DSI3. Model 1: Linear continuous response model, no interactions, αrit = α
r
t . Model 2: Linear
continuous response model with linear policy interactions, αrit = α
r
t + γ
r
t SIZEi + θ
r
tDENSITYi.
Model 3: Linear mixture distribution model with linear policy interactions, αrit = α
r
t + γ
r
t SIZEi +
θrtDENSITYi. Model 4: Additive mixture distribution model with nonparametric policy interac-
tions, αrit = α
r
t + g
r
t (SIZEi, DENSITYi). Mean values are drawn in plain line and 95% bootstrap
confidence intervals in dotted line.
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Municip. DENSITY SIZE INCOME OLD FACT BTS AGRIH URB
DSI1 218.85 105 5772 0.11 0.19 0.016 0.08 0.23
DS3 61.26 48 4324 0.30 0.06 0.037 0.19 0.032
DSI3 41.87 25 6300 0.20 0.13 0.038 0.03 0.028
DSI7 22.74 10 3724 0.14 0.16 0.007 0.22 0.015
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the municipalities selected for counterfactual analysis.
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Supplementary Material
A Data, variables and sample
After the merge of the different sheets provided by the INSEE containing information on
local employment, the demographic structure, education and land use, we get a data set
containing 36000 municipalities, that is the 98,5% of the French municipalities. While the
paper focuses specifically on rural development policies, it is worth recalling that a relevant
fraction of the municipalities received structural funds (1994-99) not specifically devoted to
rural development. These are the Objective 1 and the Objective 2 funds. Objective 1 has the
explicit aim of fostering per capita GDP growth in regions that are lagging behind the EU
average - defined as those areas with a per capita GDP of less than 75 per cent of the EU
average - and of promoting aggregate growth in the EU. Objective 2 covers regions struggling
with structural difficulties and aims to reduce the gap in socio-economic development by
financing productive investment in infrastructures, local development initiatives and business
activities. Table A1 describes the distribution of the municipalities according to the ZRR and
the structural funds schemes (1994-99).
Among the 646 municipalities under Objective 1, 350 are located in Corsica. All the
Corsica’s municipalities available in our dataset are under the Objective 1. Among them,
268 were also under ZRR scheme. The remaining 296 municipalities under Objective 1 are
located in the region Nord-Pas de Calais and were not under ZRR. Given the small number of
municipalities under the Objective 1 and their specific characteristics, we decided to remove
them from the analysis. This simplifies greatly the framework of the analysis without losing
a relevant amount of information, getting a dataset containing 35354 municipalities.
As far as Objective 2 is concerned, we initially estimated the proposed model by including
a treatment variable defined as Di ∈ {0, EU2, 5B,ZRR,ZRR&EU2, ZRR&5B}, which also
accounts for the Objective 2, EU2 (ZRR&EU2) indicating that the municipality i receive
incentives only from Objective 2 (from both Objective 2 and ZRR). However, the estimated
parameters α̂EU2t and α̂
ZRR&EU2
t (δ̂β
EU2
0t and δ̂β
ZRR&EU2
0t ) were always very close to zero and
never significant with p-values very far from standard significance levels. This result along
with the fact that the interest of this paper is on rural development, motivated the use of the
treatment variable defined in Section IV where the Objective 2 municipalities are considered
as if they had not received any treatment. The use of such a variable simplifies the analysis
and the presentation of the results without losing relevant information, also provided that
the four parameters of interest α5Bt , α
ZRR&5B
t and α
ZRR
t (δβ
5B
0t , δβ
ZRR&5B
0t and δβ
ZRR
0t ) are
fundamentally not affected by such a choice.
The dependent variable Yit (i indicating the municipality; and t the time t = 1993, ..., 2003)
measures the number of employees and has been calculated from the SIRENE data sheet
covering manufacture, trade and services, while the initial full set of regressors (measured at
time t = 1990) is composed of the following 16 variables:
Initial outcome
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SIZEi ≡ Yit0 is the initial outcome, i.e the level of employment at t0, with t0 equals to
1993;
Socio-economic and demographic variables
DENSITYi ≡ (population)i /
(
surface in terms of km2
)
i
;
OLDi ≡ (population over 65 )i / (total population)i ;
INCi ≡ (net taxable income)i / (total population)i ;
FACTi ≡ (number of factory workers)i / (total population)i;
EXEi ≡ (number of executive workers)i / (total population)i;
FARMi ≡ (number of farmers)i / (total population)i;
UNIVi ≡ (number of people with a master level degree called “Maˆıtrise universitaire”)i(total population)i ;
BTSi ≡ (number of people with a technical degree called “Brevet de Technicien Supe´rieur”)i(total population)i ;
NOEDUi ≡ (number of people without a degree)i / (total population)i;
Land use
AGRIi ≡ (farmland surface)i / (total surface)i;
CULTi ≡ (cultivated land surface)i / (total surface)i;
URBi ≡ (urban surface)i / (total surface)i;
INDi ≡ (industrial surface)i / (total surface)i;
ARAi ≡ (arable surface)i / (total surface)i;
GRAi ≡ (grassland surface)i / (total surface)i;
The socio-economic and demographic variables come from standard INSEE sources while
the variables measuring land use have been obtained from the “Corine Land Cover” base (pro-
viding remote sensing images which have been merged with the French map at a municipality
level).
The retained models, those results are presented in Section 4, have been obtained using a
backward selection procedure starting from the above set of potential explanatory variables.
Backward selection provided almost the same results as the double penalty approach proposed
by Marra and Wood (2011), those detailed results are available upon request. More precisely,
we selected the variables equation-by-equation for t = 1994, ..., 2002, by setting the threshold
level for the p-values to 0.01 and in the end, to use the same explanatory variables for all t,
we choosed the variables that were 1% significant at least for one time period, t. According
to the notation used in Section 3, these variables are noted as XY ∩D and XY ∩D¯.
For the estimation of the conditional probability of a null employment variation along
time which is expressed in eq. (11), we retained the following variables:
X
{logit}
i = (SIZEi, DENSITYi, UNIV, INC,FACTi, EXE,FARM,BTSi, NOEDU,ARAi, URBi, INDi, GRA) ,
while for the continuous part of the model referring to the subsample {i |Y Diit − Yit0 6= 0},
the variables that we selected are:
X
{continuous}
i = (SIZEi, DENSITYi, OLDi, INC, FACTi, BTSi, CULTi, AGRIi, ARAi, URBi, INDi) .
Tables A2 and A3 provide simple descriptive statistics.
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Also note that according to Heckman and Hotz (1989, pg. 865), selection bias may also
arise from the presence of variables that may influence selection into the program even if they
do not affect directly the outcome and introducing these variables into the regression solves this
additional source of selection bias. Using the notation employed in Section 3, these variables
are noted as XY¯ ∩D. We determine these variables by exploiting recent advances in generalized
additive models permitting the estimation of multinomial logistic regression (Wood et al.,
2016). This allows a flexible estimation of a generalized propensity score P [Di | Xi] as a
function of additive smooth components. Again we used the backward selection and finally
we added 3 more variables that appeared to affect selection into the programs and that were
not selected directly from the outcome equation. These variables are FARMi, NOEDUi and
GRAi. However, adding these variables does not produce relevant changes to the estimates
of the effects and detailed results are available upon request.
Finally, let broadly recall the trimming procedure we used to determine the sample for
the estimation. We dropped outlier observations which have been identified using a variety of
methods such as the visual inspection of the distribution via kernel density estimation, stan-
dard boxplot, adjusted boxplot for skewed distributions (Hubert and Vandervieren, 2008),
bivariate inspection and bivariate boxplot (Rousseeuw et al., 1999). The variables we col-
lected generally present an asymmetric distribution and in some cases are characterized by
an extremely long right tail. This is the case of SIZEi (skewness=151) and DENSITYi
(skewness=15.69), which have a crucial role in the model with interactions. For these two
variables we ended as follows. For SIZEi, we keep municipalities for which SIZEi < 500,
500 representing the 92th percentile while for DENSITYi we select municipalities having
DENSITYi < 1000, 1000 being about the 97th percentile. In both cases, the range of the
variable has been greatly reduced, from 1128000 to 499 in the first case and from 21940 to
999 in the second one. After the cleaning, the sample used for the estimation contains 25593
municipalities. For such a sample, we globally do not observe problems in terms of lack of
overlap. This feature makes the average treatment effect relevant for policy purposes.
B Identification hypotheses and placebo tests
In order to identify the causal effect, a common practice is to assume the following hypothesis
holds (see e.g. Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009),
Y rit ⊥⊥ Di | Xi, Uit ∀r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R− 1}. (14)
This general condition means that there exist both observable variables (Xi) and unobservable
variables (Uit) that are related to the potential outcomes (Y
r
it) and to the treatment status
(Di), such that given these variables, Y
r
it and Di are independent. This general formulation
encompasses the most widely used specifications in the literature. An important particular
case of the above condition is (2).
Since selection bias may not be completely eliminated only after controlling for the ob-
servables Xi, it is also important to note that a before-after approach may help to address
the issue of selection on unobservables. We thus consider (3), which is more general than (2)
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and holds for example when the unobservables Uit may be described as follows,
Uit = φ1i + vit (15)
where φ1i is a random (individual) time invariant effect, that may be correlated to the treat-
ment variable Di, and vit is a white noise. An alternative specification for the the unob-
servables is the so called random growth model (Heckman and Hotz, 1989; Wooldridge, 2005),
which assumes the following specification for Uit :
Uit = φ1i + φ2it+ vit (16)
allowing individual parameters (φ1i, φ2i) to be correlated with the treatment indicator vari-
able Di.To estimate the model, we adopt the same tranformation as in Heckman and Hotz
(1989), that is
[
Y rit − Y 0it0 − (t− t0)
(
Y 0it0 − Y 0it0−1
)]
and the underlying conditional indepen-
dence assumption on a transformed equation can be written as
[
Y rit − Y 0it0 − (t− t0)
(
Y 0it0 − Y 0it0−1
)] ⊥⊥ Di | Xi, ∀r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , R− 1}. (17)
As underlined by Heckman et al. (1999), when different methods produce different infer-
ence would suggest that selection bias is important and that some of the adopted estimators
are likely to be misspecified. In order to detect misspecified models, we implement both ‘pre-
program’ and ‘post program’ tests along the lines depicted by Heckman and Hotz (1989) and
implemented empirically in some previous papers (see e.g. Brown et al., 2006; Friedlander
and Robins, 1995). These tests are based on the idea that a valid estimator would correctly
adjust for differences in pre-program (resp. post-program) outcomes between future (resp.
past) participants and non-participants, otherwise the estimator is rejected.
These placebo tests are performed here looking at the effect of ZRR, because the avail-
ability of some years prior the introduction of the ZRR incentives, occurred in September
1996, allows us to conduct ‘pre-program’ tests, while for the program 5B, introduced in 1994,
there is not enough statistical information before its introduction. More precisely, we focus
attention on the continuous part on the model, and precisely we focus on the mean temporal
effect of ZRR. We consequently fit a model for αrit as in (10), assuming that α
r
it = α
r
t , for
tk ≤ t ≤ tm and r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1}.
The ‘pre-program’ test is generally implemented by setting t < k and by testing the sig-
nificance of the treatment effect αrt . If α
r
t is significantly different from 0 then the underlying
model fails to pass the test. However, even if the logic is compelling, if a shock or an antici-
pation effect close to the time of the treatment affects only one group but not the other, the
results from such a test are potentially misleading. This problem has also been summarized
under the heading “fallacy of alignment” (Heckman et al., 1999). In our case, treated firms
could (shortly) postpone hiring in order to obtain the public incentives, so that using quite
longer lags can be useful in order to obtain an effective test and avoiding to overestimate the
treatment effect (Brown et al., 2006; Friedlander and Robins, 1995).
Accordingly, we first use all the available information in the data and use the most distant
data before the introduction of the policy to set t0 and propose, for the before-after specifi-
cation, three tests by setting (t0 = 1993, t = 1994), (t0 = 1993, t = 1995) and (t0 = 1993,
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t = 1996), respectively. Next we set t0 = 1994. This allows both to make the before-after
and the random growth estimators directly comparable and to verify the robustness of the
previous tests to a change in the starting point t0.
A post program test has an identical structure to the pre-program test except that for
such a test t > k, when neither group receives the treatment. As for the pre-program test,
we alternatively set t0 to 1993 and 1994, whereas for t we use the last two years in the
sample, that is 2001 and 2002. The interpretation of this kind of test could be however more
problematic than that of the pre-program test since it could be that a policy has a permanent
or a long-term impact on the outcome. However, the fact that some previous studies pointed
out that various EZ have only a short run impact on employment makes the post-program
test of a certain empirical relevance here. Moreover, even if it cannot be excluded a` priori that
a rural policy produces an effect only for some few years, it is difficult to imagine a situation
in which its effect become negative after some years from its adoption. So a negative and
significant estimate of αt for t > k would suggest that the model is misspecified.
The results from such tests (Table A4) provide interesting insights which are summarized
below. A first relevant result is that, when analyzing the before-after model, setting t0 alter-
natively to 1993 and 1994 has no effect on the results of the tests. Secondly, it seems ex-post
that the results of the before-after specification which does not include the initial conditions
are quite unsatisfactory, specifically looking at the post-program tests since the effect of the
policy decreases overtime becoming not only negative but also statistically significant at the
end of the period for t = 2001 and t = 2002, with p-values very close to zero. Such a nega-
tive and decreasing overtime estimates for the post treatment periods could indicate that the
assumptions underlying the identification of the causal effect are still too restrictive to obtain
a credible result. This could arise because i) the treated municipalities are expected to have a
different (i.e. lower) time trend than non treated ones even in absence of the policy; ii) some
observable factors can be related to the policy placement (also affecting the outcome variable),
those omission from the model causes the so called overt bias, to adopt the terminology from
Lee (2005) and Rosenbaum (2002). A third relevant result is that adding (nonparametrically)
the initial conditions greatly improves the results of the tests (this specification passes both
pre and post program tests) and provides much more credible results. Moreover, non reported
results indicate that using an additive model instead of a linear specification improves greatly
the alignment.
A central issue concerns the comparison of the before-after with the random growth. If
the initial conditions are not included the random growth, similarly to the before-after, does
not pass the post-program tests and provide negative and decreasing overtime estimates of
the treatment effect with with p-values below standard levels. When the initial conditions
are included, the results are as follows. While the before-after clearly passes the tests with
estimates close to zero and not significant (p-values are equal to 0.771 and 0.847), the
random growth still provides estimates of αt for the post-program period which are highly
negative (-3.681 and -4.787) and show a decreasing trend overtime with associated p-values
equal to 0.300 and 0.232, which are much lower than those obtained with the before-after
specification. Looking at the estimates for all available t may provide further insights. The
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random growth provides estimates of the effect of ZRR that are negative for all t, are relatively
high in magnitude and are increasing in absolute value with t.
These tests suggest the use of a before-after specification added with the initial conditions
and allowing for nonparametric effects of such initial conditions. For such a model, a very good
alignment is obtained pre and post treatment. We do not intend to claim that we have found
the ‘true’ model but a purpose of this paper has been to reduce the risk of misspecification by
relying on semi-parametric modeling and variable selection and by discarding specifications
that fail to provide a good alignment.
C Extension: spatial spillovers
The proposed model is flexible and modular enough so that it can be extended in various
directions. As an illustrative example, we address the relevant issue of the possible existence
of policy effects on neighboring municipalities, i.e. spatial spillover effects (see e.g. Behaghel
et al., 2015). To save space, the analysis is restricted to the continuous part of the model.
One standard way to deal with this issue consists in introducing, in the model, explanatory
variables accounting for the absence or the presence of the policies in the neighboring mu-
nicipalities. Ex ante, for both ZRR and 5B, the spillovers may be either positive arising
directly through a higher labor demand and/or indirectly from agglomeration economies or
negative if some substitution effects occur. In practice, the identification of spillovers is an
intricate empirical matter, requiring the definition of the neighborhood and the choice of an
adequate channel of transmission. We focus here on purely geographic spillovers and adopt
a very restrictive notion of neighborhood by considering the spillovers arising from the mu-
nicipalities sharing a common border. Among the 25593 municipalities under study, 10523
municipalities have all their neighboring municipalities that do not receive any funds, 2496
municipalities have all their neighboring municipalities that are under 5B but not under ZRR
while for 239 municipalities, the entire neighborhood is under ZRR but not under 5B. There
is also a group of 7888 municipalities that have some neighboring municipalities under 5B and
some other neighboring municipalities which are under ZRR. Finally, there is a group of 4447
municipalities with all the neighboring municipalities under both 5B and ZRR.
With this classification in mind, we build a new categorical variable, denoted by WDi ∈
{0, 5 ALL,Z ALL, 5&Z SOME, 5&Z ALL}, with modalities corresponding to the above
mentioned categories and the corresponding parameters are noted ω5 ALLt , ω
Z ALL
t , ω
5&Z SOME
t
and ω5&Z ALLt . These parameters capture the spillover effects by measuring the mean differ-
ential effect, over the whole sample, with respect to the reference category which is chosen to
be 0, i.e. the category of municipalities having neighboring municipalities that do not receive
any funds. The new variable WDi is then added as an additional explanatory variable in
the regression functions given in (9) and (10). The estimation results indicate no significant
spillover effects, meaning that both ZRR and 5B produced an effect that remains spatially
localized. Geographic spillovers are never statistically significant with p-values being always
very far from standard significance levels. Note finally that the absence of significant spillover
effects still holds when considering many alternative definitions of WD based on different
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Figure A1: Spillover effects. Contour plots.
considerations about geographic proximity (detailed results are available upon request). This
result is consistent with a recent literature on regional policy evaluation suggesting that policy
spillovers do not occur or at best, they are modest in magnitude (see e.g. Becker et al., 2010;
Behaghel et al., 2015; Gobillon et al., 2012).
Interestingly, it appears that if we consider a more flexible model that allows nonparametric
interactions effects we get a different picture. In particular, some interactive spillovers appear
now highly significant. Note also that after a model selection procedure, the same variables
that have been employed in Section 4 are retained in the model, that is SIZE and DENSITY,
to interact with WD. We also get again that an additive structure is rejected in favor of a
bivariate smooth function. This result provides additional empirical support to the importance
of considering flexible models in order to let the data a chance to speak.
We finally provide a brief comment to the results presented in Figure A1.5 For WDi ∈
{5 ALL, 5&Z ALL}, we find evidence of significant interactive spillover effects. A relevant
result is that, for both modalities, spillovers are very low or even negative for low levels of
both SIZE and DENSITY, while they become positive and reach their maximum level for
municipalities characterized by high levels of both variables.
5As in previous figures, the domain of the continuous variables has been appropriately
reduced to the regions where the effects are significant. To save space we focus only on
t = 1999.
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Structural Funds/ZRR 0 1 total
0 10831 401 11232
1 378 268 646
2 6815 590 7405
5B 6641 10076 16717
total 24665 11335 36000
Table A1: Distribution of the municipalities according to ZRR and Structural Funds schemes
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics
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Table A3: The evolution of employment overtime. Values refer to ∆ Employment calculated
as Employment(t)-Employment(t0). Time t is allowed to vary between 1994 to 2002 and t0
is equal to 1993. M indicates the median. The values between brackets indicate the relative
frequency in terms of percentage of the modal value.
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Table A4: Placebo tests
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CONTINUOUS PART DISCRETE PART
t
αZRRt α
5B
t α
ZRR&5B
t δβ
ZRR
0t δβ
5B
0t δβ
ZRR&5B
0t
1996
-0.049
(0.958)
0.114
(0.868)
-0.010
(0.990)
0.108
(0.061)
-0.055
(0.348)
0.053
(0.334)
1997
-0.1418
(0.882)
0.894
(0.201)
0.764
(0.415)
0.147
(0.017)
-0.147
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.993)
1998
0.2119
(0.8367)
0.864
(0.251)
1.087
(0.277)
0.0874
(0.168)
-0.124
(0.050)
-0.037
(0.535)
1999
2.159
(0.063)
1.378
(0.100)
3.537
(0.001)
0.047
(0.463)
-0.131
(0.044)
-0.083
(0.178)
2000
1.372
(0.258)
0.721
(0.438)
2.381
(0.044)
0.054
(0.419)
-0.098
(0.142)
-0.043
(0.491)
2001
1.0862
(0.418)
1.376
(0.173)
2.454
(0.059)
0.051
(0.460)
-0.131
(0.058)
-0.079
(0.225)
2002
-0.174
(0.912)
1.017
(0.408)
1.279
(0.406)
0.124
(0.071)
-0.089
(0.212)
0.034
(0.594)
gZRRt g
5B
t g
ZRR&5B
t
1996
10.666
(3.33e-08)
7.766
(4.72e-04)
10.574
(1.67e-09)
1997
11.019
(3.91e-08)
5.725
(0.144)
11.034
(2.83e-10)
1998
10.911
(3.26e-10)
3.495
(0.033)
10.960
(2e-16)
1999
12.703
(1.25e-15)
3.029
(7.88e-04)
12.703
(5.15e-15)
2000
13.195
(3.24e-16)
7.750
(6.66e-07)
13.232
(1.36e-14)
2001
10.144
(2e-16)
5.088
(2.15e-04)
8.695
(2e-16)
2002
7.977
(5.43e-13)
7.842
(4.73e-10)
8.285
(2.47e-13)
Table A5: Main results. For the continuous part, αrit = α
r
t + g
r
t (SIZE,DENSITY )
and non-isotropic tensor product splines (Wood, 2006) are used for the bivariate functions
grt (SIZE,DENSITY ). For such nonparametric components: we report the effective degrees
of freedom with p-values in brackets. For the parametric components of both continuous
and discrete parts, αrt and δβ
ZRR b
0t , we report the estimated coefficient with p-values in
brackets.
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